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How to Undo Things with Words:
Infelicitous Practices and Infelicitous Agents
Abstract. This paper offers a new interpretation of Austin (the New Austin) that overcomes the Austin-
Derrida debate by dissolving the dichotomy between construction and deconstruction and focusing on the
notion of performative reconstruction. The essay also contains a discussion of the normative distinction
between felicity and infelicity and how it affects the identity of speakers and agents. This discussion
draws on recent Gender and Queer Theory and builds a bridge between the literature on identity and
Speech Act Theory. The central argument in this paper proposes a negotiating model of performativity
and a robust notion of discursive responsibility that underscores the intimate and unavoidable links
between the semantic and the socio-political.
Introduction.
In his discussions of performative utterances Austin recognized not only our capacity to do things with
words, but also our capacity to undo things with words. To begin with, just as he identified utterances
that perform certain linguistic acts such as making a promise, or issuing an apology or a warning, he also
recognized illocutionary acts that undo things: annulling a marriage, declaring a contract void and null,
taking back a promise, etc. And just as the consequences of our utterances (especially their reception by
others) can produce perlocutionary effects, such as being persuaded, feeling insulted, being amused, etc.,
they can also undo the perlocutionary effects of other acts, for example, by weakening or undermining
prior acts of persuasion, or by undoing an insult, or by consoling or comforting those who have been
injured in language by verbal aggressions. Moreover, all these are things that we can do or undo in and
through language, not only explicitly and directly, but also tacitly and indirectly. Austin showed that
most of our illocutionary acts are not openly and explicitly identified as such (“I hereby encourage you to
pursue a graduate degree in philosophy”, “I hereby warn you that there is a dangerous bull in the area”);
but they are often performed in tacit and truncated ways (“come on, you can do it”, or “watch out”, or
“bull”), and even covertly as mere insinuations (an encouraging look, a disapproving glance, or a
reproachful stare). Similarly, it is not difficult to recognize that there is an entire array of things that are
tacitly undone in and through our linguistic actions, often unconsciously, often without either the speaker
or the audience noticing them, escaping everyone’s attention. More radically, I submit that performative
doings and undoings go hand in hand, that we are constantly undoing certain things while doing others,
and doing things while undoing others. My goal here is to overcome any radical dichotomy between
doing and undoing, between performative construction and deconstruction. This issue connects with the
debate between Austin and Derrida1 about whether the force of our words derive from the constructive or
from the deconstructive aspects of our speech acts, that is, from their continuation with or from their
breakage with customs, institutions, and traditions, from doing or from undoing things within them. As I
have argued elsewhere (2005 & 2006), our speech acts always contain continuities and discontinuities
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with the practices in which they are inscribed since these practices always have many possible
trajectories. Our speech acts do certain things and undo others within those practices, constructing and
deconstructing aspects of these practices simultaneously, that is, constantly reconstructing them as they
continue them, reshaping or redirecting them (while discontinuing certain elements in them—whether
actual or potential). My suggestion is that it is the pragmatic notion of reconstruction that can dissolve
the false dichotomy between performative construction and deconstruction, and offer a better model of
linguistic performativity. So my thesis is that, at least tacitly, all our discursive acts involve both doing
and undoing things with words. On my view, linguistic performance is both constructive and
deconstructive: it is a matter of Redoing or Reconstructing. And the targets of our performative redoings
or reconstructions are not only practices and institutions, but also the people who participate in them.
I will develop my argument in two parts. The first part will discuss the performative reconstruction
of the norms of a practice through an examination of how the normative distinction between felicity
and infelicity is done, undone, and redone through our performance. The goal of this discussion
will be to elucidate how our doings, undoings, and redoings can reinforce, challenge, and critically
reconstruct the received norms of a practice or institution. The second part of the paper will focus
on the reconstructive processes (the performative doings and undoings) that contribute to the
construction of different aspects of identity and the articulation of speaking subjectivities. My
discussion of the performative construction (or domestication) of identity will focus on the
processes of exclusion and stigmatization that operate in our discursive practices and on the spaces
available to us for critical resistance against these processes.
I. The Normativity of Linguistic Performance and the Practice of Infelicity.
Our linguistic acts can be felicitous and infelicitous depending on whether or not they successfully
achieve what they set out to do. But what determines whether a linguistic act is successfully
accomplished? What is the relationship between felicity and infelicity? How do we draw that
normative distinction in our practices? I will start this discussion with an interpretative thesis about
Austin, which will in turn take us beyond Austin to a discussion of the normative presuppositions
of performative doings and undoings.
The received interpretation of Austin2 has misconceived the normative significance of the
infelicities that our speech acts are subject to. The mistake that the received interpretation of Austin
makes is to think of these infelicities as purely accidental occurrences, while in fact they are
constitutive of the normative structure of the performative. The standard reading of Austin misses
the normative significance of performative failures and therefore also their critical potential. I will
try to show that these failures are of paramount importance for the reworking of the normative
structure of our practices. Let’s start with Austin’s famous claims and definitions:
Performing actions then, as actions, […] will be subject to certain whole dimensions of
unsatisfactoriness to which all actions are subject. (1975, p. 21)
We shall call in general those infelicities […] which are such that the act […] is not
achieved, by the name of MISFIRES; and on the other hand we may christen those
infelicities where the act is achieved ABUSES. (1975, p. 16)
My interpretative thesis is that, on the Austinian view, performative failures—misfires and abuses
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— are not mere accidental occurrences. Our performative success requires that these failures can
occur; their possibility is constitutive of the very possibility of success, that is, it constitutes what
success means in any particular case. This is what I call the Constitutivity Thesis about failure or
infelicity. My discussion will try to underscore the enormous normative significance of the fact that
our speech acts are always susceptible to misfires and abuses. In order to illustrate these two kinds
of infelicities, we can consider the speech act of declaring two people a married couple—one of
Austin’s favorite examples of performative utterance. An abuse of this performative procedure or
ceremony occurs when it is performed by an impostor—that is, by someone posing as a priest in a
religious wedding or as a city-official in a civil marriage. Here we have an instance of a violation of
one of the felicity conditions—that the speaker be properly invested with the authority to perform
the act—which nonetheless does not prevent the act from being achieved. By contrast, a misfire
occurs when the violation of one of the established felicity conditions does prevent the act from
being achieved. We would have instances of misfire whenever two people of the same sex are
declared married in a jurisdiction in which there is legislation prohibiting same-sex marriage. But
note how thin, shaky, and indeed movable are the lines that are supposed to separate abuses from
misfires and both cases of performative failure from successful performances. Our example of an
impostor performing a wedding illustrates how easily an abuse can become a misfire: it all depends
on whether or not the impostor is recognized as such; it is the success of the deception that marks
the successful (even if abusive) achievement of the act. On the other hand, the example of same-sex
marriage shows how misfires can be turned into successful performances, as indeed recently
happened in San Francisco when Mayor Gavin Newsom decided to grant marriage licenses to same-
sex couples.3 But the most cursory reflection on these recent events show that matters are more
complicated: some people thought that these locally sanctioned marriages were in fact abuses and
the courts should correct them; and so far, they have been declared void by the courts and, thus
annulled, these ceremonies have become misfires: acts that were never properly achieved and
therefore never happened as such, strictly speaking.4 So the boundary between successfully
accomplished performances and failed speech acts is not a hard and fast one. Even if there seem to
be clear cases, there is always room for negotiations.
It is important to note that the negotiations that go into the making of speech acts and establish their
felicity conditions can lead to different results from community to community, even within the
same social or political unit. So, for example, while in most states of the U.S. same-sex marriage
ceremonies are either abuses or misfires, as of now this is not so in Massachusetts where they are
felicitous performances when properly conducted, for they have been legalized by the legislature
(which was forced to do so by the State Supreme Court)—although the validity of these marriages
will surely be challenged in the future. These recent attempts to expand the scope of the institution
of marriage underscore the room for normative transformations that is always present in our
practices and institutions, no matter how old and rigidified they appear to be at any given time.
There is certainly room for different normative attitudes in the assessment of these cases: some
people deem these same-sex marriage ceremonies misfires, others abuses, others infelicitous acts of
a regular kind, and yet others felicitous acts that are simply adventurous and pioneer in their novel
kind of felicity. But no matter how strongly we may feel about these cases, it is clear that the
relevant legal, social, and political practices are flexible enough to allow for disagreements and
reasonable disputes, leaving different courses of action open to us. Without disregarding the
constraints that emerge from established practices, social institutions, and historical traditions, it is
important to recognize that, within some limits, it is ultimately up to us how to carve the normative
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space that separates felicities from infelicities.5
Our performative procedures and rituals can misfire, and they can be abused; but what is the
significance of all this? Infelicities can be seen as occasions to call into question the normativity of
our practices, as opportunities to critically interrogate the norms that regulate our speech acts and
test their limits. As active members of discursive practices and their institutions, we participate in
the reworking of normative structures, in the continuation or discontinuation of discursive norms in
particular ways. For this we have to take responsibility. We are always confronted with new
contexts and new possible ways of speaking and signifying; and our discursive agency has to take
responsibility for opening or closing possibilities in our practices. This responsibility emerges with
every use of language; it attaches itself to all utterances and to all silences (insofar as they are
speech acts or moves in a language-game). Through our agency the normative structure of our
practices can always be modified in a variety of ways. We can try to keep our discursive norms as
intact as possible and work hard for maintaining them stable; but we have to remember that the
continuity and stability of these norms, if attained, are always performative achievements, and
achievements that do not eliminate the ever present possibility of these norms being augmented or
expanded, diminished, and even reversed. The openness of discursive contexts grounds the ever
present possibility of revising the discursive norms underlying these contexts, of undoing and
redoing the normative structure of discursive practices. The rules we follow can always come
undone.
The normative failures of the performative have a critical potential and can, at least in principle, be
used as the path to undo and/or redo the normative structures of our discursive practices. Failing
performances can implicitly or explicitly suggest that things COULD be done differently.
Alternatively, they can simply be taken to be a way of calling our attention to the fact that things
can NOT (and must NOT) be done in THIS (alternative) way. In this respect it is important to note
the crucial critical potential that fictional discourses have. Insofar as standard felicity conditions are
suspended in the sphere of the fictional, fictional discourses are failed performatives—and indeed
Austin often talks about them in this way. Fiction can be thought of as abusive language or a kind
of symbolic misfiring (abortive ‘language’). But this does not undermine the significance of fiction.
On the contrary, this gives fictional discourses a special position in our discursive practices: they
are very valuable abuses or misfires of language. Their special importance resides in their capacity
to critically question the norms of our actual practices by providing alternative normative
frameworks. Fictional discourses are invaluable critical tools in experimenting with the felicity
conditions of our acts. By giving free rein to the imagination, we are capable of playing with
felicity conditions: we can think up different (and often unexpected) ways in which felicity
conditions can be violated; we can explore the consequences of these violations; and we can also
invent felicity conditions that are altogether different from current ones and explore the
consequences of complying with these alternative conditions as well as the consequences of
violating them. But of course the distinction between the felicitous and the infelicitous is not only
critically questioned through the imagination but also through our agency in real life. Social
experimentation and political activism often take the shape of attempts at transforming the
infelicitous into the felicitous, subverting this distinction and promoting social change.
As occasions of critical interrogation, infelicities play a crucial role in critically questioning the
(movable) boundary or normative frontier between performative successes and failures. The
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received interpretation of Austin’s view misses this crucial critical significance of infelicities or
failing acts by construing them as something purely accidental and external to the normative
constitution of our speech acts. On this interpretation, abuses are simply degenerative cases of
speech acts, performativity gone wrong; and misfires are conceptualized as being outside speech
altogether, that is, as non-acts, as very peculiar things that simply look like performative utterances:
as performative freaks that have the misleading appearance of being linguistic acts but in fact aren’t.
By misplacing the emphasis on the contingency and externality of infelicities, speech-act theorists
have often missed that performative failures have an internal and necessary character: they are
constitutive and unavoidable.
In the first place, the unavoidable character of performative failures follows directly from the fact
that speech acts do not fall under the sovereign control of subjects or institutions. It follows from
the uncontrollability of discursive agency that there are no guarantees for performative success:
speech acts can always go wrong, or simply develop in ways that had not been anticipated (by the
individuals and institutions involved, or by the codified norms to which these acts are subject).
Occasional performative failures are bound to occur in our discursive practices. Nothing short of a
miracle could prevent their occurrence. But, in the second place, independently of their actual
occurrence, performative failures are necessary in a certain sense: although their actual occurrence
is indeed purely contingent, their possibility is necessary. Whether failures actually occur or not,
their possibility is always there, casting a shadow on our successes. Failing is constitutive of the
performative insofar as the performative has a normative dimension and can, therefore, be felicitous
or infelicitous. The normative dimension of performativity presupposes that things can be done right
or wrong, correctly or incorrectly: an act can be achieved properly or improperly; and it can also be
attempted without being achieved at all. Successful performances are achieved against the
background of infelicities; and performative success depends on the maintenance of this
background, that is, on pushing a whole array of possible acts out of the realm of the performative,
keeping them in check as failing possibilities. In this sense the Austinian view of performative
utterances suggests that the abnormal is the precondition of the normal and, therefore, infelicities
are the precondition of felicity.
Whether intentionally or not, performative failures can become critical interventions in the practice
in which they occur. The normative significance that attaches to an occasional failure depends on
whether and how the failure is echoed and repeated in the actions of others; some failures may be
repeated enough times so that it becomes a performative chain that, though initially parasitic on
another chain, takes a life of its own and becomes an alternative practice or an extension (or
alternative configuration) of the current practice. Performative chains are always vulnerable to
failing practice or to what we can call the practice of failure or the practice of infelicity. Repeated
failures, or the practice of infelicity, can amount to ways of resisting the established normative order
that regulates the practice. The critical potential of the practice of performative failures cannot be
overemphasized: the normative failures of the performative can reconfigure normative contexts of
communication and reshape our norms. The practice of infelicity can have the effect of weakening
and eventually relaxing the felicity conditions of an act, allowing for new kinds of performative
success. It calls our attention to borderline cases and cases that are arbitrarily excluded from the
realm of the performative. The practice of failure or infelicity can also suggest a more radical
possibility, namely, that the infelicities of today could become the felicities or performative
successes of tomorrow. Here we have a case of doing or redoing while undoing. This is, for
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example, the hope of gay and lesbian activists who are trying to obtain legal recognition for same-
sex marriages, thus redoing or reconstructing the secular institution of civil marriage while undoing
its exclusionary aspects. On the other hand, the practice of infelicity can also involve undoing
things while doing them or redoing them. As Butler (1990, 1993, 1997) has argued, this seems to
be the goal of parodic performances that practice infelicity and exploit failing possibilities in order
to expose the arbitrary bounds of the felicitous and the normal—i.e. the normal conditions on which
preformative successes are supposed to rest.
As Butler puts it, when we examine our discursive practices and their normative consequences we
have to ask: “Is there a possibility of disrupting and subverting the effects produced by such speech,
a faultline exposed that leads to the undoing of this process of discursive constitution?” (1997, p.
19) Following Austin, Butler argues that the possibility of performative failure is always there and
it constitutes the condition of a critical response and resistance, for example, through parodic
performance. This omnipresent possibility of failure (which opens up the possibility of critique and
transformation in every context) was already emphasized by Austin.6 But this is something that the
received interpretation of Austin has missed7 and has, therefore, failed to realize that Austin’s
account of the performative already contains the theoretical elements required to explain how we
not only do but also undo and redo things with words.
The Austinian account of performativity suggests that the critical elucidation of our discursive
practices and their normative structures requires the critical reconstruction of felicity: that is, the
critical undoing and redoing of felicity, of the felicity conditions and the concomitant infelicity
conditions of our speech acts. This critical reconstruction of felicity entails the reconstruction of
normalcy, for the felicity and infelicity of acts depend on what are considered to be normal and
abnormal conditions. Austin recognizes this when he poignantly remarks: “To examine excuses is
to examine cases where there has been some abnormality or failure: and as so often, the abnormal
will throw light on the normal, will help us to penetrate the blinding veil of ease and obviousness
that hides the mechanisms of the natural successful act.” (1979, pp. 179-180; emphasis preserved
and added) There is a taken-for-granted normative background that supports our actions and
practices, a background of assumptions and expectations (“the mechanisms of the natural successful
act”) that we are blind to. This blindness to what counts as normal is the blindness to the tacit
norms of our practices. This normative blindness has also been underscored by Wittgenstein’s
discussion of rule-following and in sociology by the critical studies of ethnomethodology.8
The critical reconstruction of normalcy requires the inspection of those tacit norms that we are
typically blind to. We have to uncover the conditions of normalcy that are assumed and taken for
granted. While unreconstructed, these normative conditions remain protected from critical
questioning precisely because they have been hidden in the background and have become invisible
to us. The reconstruction of normalcy, therefore, involves undoing the normative blindness to
which all speakers are subject; that is, it involves piercing “the blinding veil of ease and
obviousness”. In order to overcome our blindness to the norms that shape our actions and
judgments in the games we play, we have to step outside of what comes “natural”, of what is
obvious and taken for granted. Hence the importance of disruptive moments which, by violating
normative assumptions and expectations, bring tacit norms to the foreground and render them
visible. In this sense, the practice of failure or infelicity can afford us normative lucidity; that is, it
can restore our sight with respect to the norms that our own behavior embodies and responds to.
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Through the practice of failure or infelicity we can repair our blindness and gain normative sight
piecemeal, context by context.
It is of crucial importance to exploit the critical potential of performative failures, which can be
taken as occasions for transforming the infelicitous into the felicitous and thus rethinking and
redoing the norms underlying our discursive practices. Failing performatives can be used to redirect
a practice, to undo and redo its normative structure by rethinking the (often assumed and taken for
granted) conditions for felicity and infelicity. The liberating potential of the practice of infelicity—
of stigmatized eccentric agency—can be appreciated even more fully when we recognize that the
normative distinctions between felicity and infelicity apply not only to our discursive agency but
also to our identity as speakers and agents.
II. Doing and Undoing Ourselves: Felicitous and Infelicitous Agents.
The norms of linguistic performativity are of crucial importance not only for the things we do with
language but also for the things we are in language. Linguistic performativity has a crucial
significance for different aspects of our identity, and not only for their expression, but also for their
formation or constitution, as performative theories of identity have argued.9 As Butler (1990, 1993,
2004), Sedgwick (1990), and other feminist theorists have argued, gender is not simply something
that we are, but also something that we do: gender norms are constantly being enacted and
reenacted in our linguistic practices. And we can perform our gender felicitously or infelicitously,
depending on whether or not our gender performances conform to the established norms of
masculinity and femininity. This performative account has also been applied to other aspects of
identity such as sexual orientation, race and ethnicity.10 We perform these different aspects of our
identity through our speech acts in all kinds of ways—through diction, tone, use of specific words
and expressions, particular claims and assertions, etc; and the performance of our gender, sexuality,
race, and ethnicity is deemed felicitous or infelicitous according to its conformity with standardized
or normalized social expectations and accepted norms of conduct. But there are different kinds of
felicity and infelicity here. I want to propose the following distinction concerning non-conforming
performances of identity that are deemed infelicitous. We have to distinguish between the kind of
infelicity that is simply incidental and does not affect the identity of the violator or the status or
content of the norm infringed—an occasional deviation of a previously established norm that is
accepted in the community and can be appealed to straightforwardly (saying, for example, “That is
simply not masculine behavior”, “Things are not done that way”, or “One should not speak that
way”); and, on the other hand, a kind of infelicity that is constitutive, not because it violates any
law written in stone or any essential constitution of the relevant aspect of identity, but, on the
contrary, precisely because it institutes what cannot be done, because it exemplifies infelicity and
thus becomes an exemplar or prototype of transgression, a paradigm of how things should not be
done, setting and reinforcing the norms and normative expectations that structure the relevant
practice (doing gender, doing race, etc). The former are infelicitous acts while the latter are the acts
of infelicitous subjects. This distinction between infelicitous acts and the acts of infelicitous subjects
(between incidental and constitutive infelicities) is a distinction that enables us to recognize
different ways in which the normativity of a linguistic practice operates and develops: it is crucial
for linguistic normativity that not only speech acts but also speakers can be infelicitous.
Infelicitous subjects are the non-conformists. They may acquire this deviant status in the practice
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through an original transgression or series of transgressive acts; the status of infelicitous performers
may also be attributed to them quite arbitrarily without any explicit violation on their part (on the
basis of a rumor, a fear, a projection, or whatever the case may be). But however they acquire their
status, the important point is that deviation or transgression becomes the distinctive mark of these
speakers, defining who they are as linguistic agents: their modes of comportment, their linguistic
habitus, and their ways of generating speech acts are perceived as having an inescapable deviant or
transgressive character. Infelicity has been inscribed in their very identity; and they have been
deemed inadequate for the performative expression of certain aspects of their identity: everything
they say and do becomes a paradigm of how NOT to signify femininity, blackness, Hispanicity,
Americanness, or whatever the case may be. No matter what the origin of their stigmatization as
linguistic agents happens to be (their accent, their diction, any aspect of their linguistic habitus,
certain aspects of their lifestyle, etc.), infelicitous performers play a special role in the normative
economy of a practice as living and walking exemplars of infelicity, of how things should not be
done, and of what can happen to you—to anyone—if you are not careful enough to comply with
the established norms and the accepted patterns of behavior. For the normalization of our modes of
expression and the disciplining of possible violations and transgressions (which cannot all be
anticipated in explicit codes), it is of the utmost importance that infelicity can attach itself (and
adhere its negative force) not only to particular acts but also to particular identities, which can
produce an indefinite number of transgressions and thus delineate indirectly, in a piecemeal fashion,
how things are to be done. Although—as Austin emphasized—there is no complete set of rules or
algorithm that can guarantee the attainment of felicity in our speech acts, prudential considerations
can be derived in an indirect and negative way from the following general rule of thumb: “Do not
associate yourself with infelicitous subjects and stay away from their distinctive ways of producing
speech acts.”
Infelicitous subjects are at the normative margins of our practices. They are border people,11 the
very embodiment of the normative frontiers between felicity and infelicity which are drawn
piecemeal from practice to practice and from context to context, and are used to discipline not only
our agency but also our very identity. It is not only particular acts or even whole practices, but also
particular speakers and even entire groups of speakers and agents—entire identities—that are
deemed infelicitous. In the normative economy of our discursive practices infelicitous subjects play
the important role of negative exemplars.12 This negative exemplarity is achieved by inscribing
infelicity in the very identity of subjects through processes of stigmatization and marginalization of
particular types of subjectivities and their voices—for example, transgendered and queer
subjectivities. It is important to note that, insofar as these infelicitous subjects are negative
exemplars, these processes of stigmatization and marginalization are also—indirectly—normative
processes for disciplining the linguistic performance of all speakers; that is, they are processes to
which all speakers are subject, including so-called normal speakers who are themselves a product of
these normalizing processes.
As an illustration, let’s consider the stigmatization of the language and identity of Chicanos as
discussed by Gloria Anzaldúa. In Borderlands/La Frontera, Anzaldúa discusses the language and
identity of those who live at the limits or borders between communities—en la frontera. She tells
us that at the core of her Chicana identity is a cultural duplicity that makes her appear as fully
foreign and even deviant to those outside her ethnic group. She emphasizes that those who have
frontier identities often display signs of cultural otherness in their faces and bodies, in their manners
Essays in Philosophy
file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/gilm5276/Desktop/Essays%20HTML/medina.html[9/18/2009 5:08:58 PM]
and comportment, and in their speech. These are signs that often come under attack, being subject
to the domesticating social and cultural forces that conspire to erase them. Our bodies and habits are
disciplined; our tongues are tamed. In this respect, Anzaldúa talks about the concerted efforts “to
get rid of our accents”, which she describes as a violent attack on one’s identity and basic rights:
“Attacks on one’s form of expression with the intent to censor are a violation of the First
Amendment. El Anglo con cara de inocente nos arrancó la lengua. Wild tongues can’t be tamed,
they can only be cut out.” (p. 76)
It is important to note that the efforts to tame one’s tongue do not come only from outside one’s
group. Anzaldúa poignantly remarks that her Chicana tongue is not only tamed —and ultimately
“cut out”—by the Anglos, but also by other Hispanics. Chicano Spanish is not recognized and
respected by many other Spanish speakers: “Even our own people, other Spanish speakers, nos
quieren poner candados en la boca. […] Chicano Spanish is considered by the purist and by most
Latinos deficient, a mutilation of Spanish.” (pp. 76-77) And this scorn and disciplining efforts come
not just from other Spanish speakers, but from Chicanas and Chicanos themselves, who have
internalized the alleged inferiority of their language and, ultimately, of their identity. “Chicanas who
grew up speaking Chicano Spanish have internalized the belief that we speak poor Spanish […] we
use our language differences against each other.” (p. 80) Thus Chicanos are left speaking “an
orphan tongue”.13
The domestication of a border language such as Chicano Spanish leaves its speakers tongue-tied,
speechless, indeed as if their tongues had been cut out, for they are rendered unable to express
themselves in their own ways. The social stigmatization and cultural orphanage of their forms of
expression amount to the marginalization of their very identities:14 “If a person, Chicana or Latina,
has a low estimation of my native tongue, she has also a low estimation of me. […] I am my
language. Until I can take pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself.” (pp. 80-81) This
moment of self-empowerment through one’s tongue is a moment of cultural pride and cultural
affirmation. It involves a demand for cultural solidarity, for the formation of a proud linguistic
community liberated from self-hatred, a community in which the marginalized tongue finds a home
and a family and is no longer orphan.15 As Anzaldúa suggests, a common tongue that can express
people’s “realities and values” makes possible the cultural process of community formation around
a shared form of life. Through a common tongue people can articulate their shared experiences,
problems, needs, interests, values, etc.; and thus cultural solidarity becomes possible. For this
reason, Chicano Spanish deserves recognition and respect from the members of the Hispanic
community as well from other cultural groups. For this reason also, we ought to acknowledge the
special cultural productivity of border tongues in general, for they make possible the articulation of
new experiences and new forms of identity, facilitating the diversification of cultural norms and
cultural expectations. The task of cultural self-affirmation through language is a complex and
ongoing task. It is extremely complex because it has to be constantly diversified, making sure that
no voices are left out.16 And it is also a never-ending task, for cultures and cultural identities are
living things that are always changing.
We need to destabilize whatever cultural borders or frontiers are erected, whatever relations of
inclusion and exclusion are established in the cultural landscape. This critical activity of
interrogation and destabilization of cultural boundaries has to be performatively carried out through
our undoings and redoings, that is, through our reconstruction or rearticulation of the ways in
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which identity is expressed and perceived in our practices and communities. And it is important to
note that the goal of this critical reconstruction, of undoing performative oppression, is to liberate
not only infelicitous speech acts, but also infelicitous speakers with an infelicitous language.
The performative undoing of these processes of stigmatization involves redrawing the normative
boundaries between felicity and infelicity context by context. It involves, in the case of Chicanos,
creating the conditions in which the cultural pride and cultural solidarity of an ethnic group becomes
possible, empowering the members of this group so as to guarantee that their economic, social,
political, and cultural agency is on an equal footing with that of other groups. Sometimes acquiring
a voice or gaining respect for one’s voice only becomes possible if society commits itself to deep
structural transformations required to guarantee equality. In this way, the normative issues of
performative felicity and infelicity must be thought of as continuous with socio-economic and
political issues. Indeed doing, undoing, and redoing things with language involve shaping and
reshaping our communities, the social relations they allow, their norms, and the material conditions
and structures in which the lives of these communities take place. In the light of these remarks I
want to conclude with the suggestion that we should radically rethink the notion of discursive
responsibility, overcoming the minimalist notion that has been made popular in the philosophy of
language by recent deflationary tendencies, inflating it if you will, and connecting the responsibility
of speakers in their interactions with their ethical and political responsibilities as participants in
social practices and political institutions. For, as my critical discussion of performative doings and
undoings suggest, the normative issues that affect our linguistic performance are inextricably tied to
ethical and political issues concerning equality and social justice. The contribution that my
discussion of performative failure and infelicity hopes to make is to gesture toward a more robust
notion of discursive responsibility, one according to which we should be held accountable not only




1. In what follows I will not develop an analysis and critical examination of the Austin-Derrida
debate, which I have done elsewhere: in my (2005), pp. 157-167, and in my (2006), chapter 3
(section 3.3. “The Scandal of Our Agency”).
2. See especially Searle (1969), but also Katz (1977). In my (2006) I contrast this received
interpretation with what I term the New Austin.
3. I have discussed this example at greater length in my (2005) and (2006).
4. But of course the legal and political battle is still ongoing and this decision could be reversed by
the Supreme Court.
5. The normative distinctions between felicity, infelicity, and radical performative failures appear to
be fixed, absolute, and incontestable only when there is a background agreement about the norms of
conduct which is taken for granted by (or simply forced upon) most—if not all—the members of
the linguistic practice. This apparently unquestionable normative order can always become unstable
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and sometimes even break down when the background consensus is called into question.
6. As Butler notes, “the question of mechanical breakdown or ‘misfire’ and of the unpredictability
of speech is precisely what Austin repeatedly emphasizes when he focuses on the various ways in
which a speech act can go wrong.” (1997, p. 19).
7. Thus, by not calling into question the received reading of Austin, Derrida (1982) also misses the
critical potential of Austin’s view. It is because of his reliance on the received reading that Derrida
contends: “That the value of risk or of being open to failure, although it might, as Austin
recognizes, affect the totality of conventional acts, is not examined as an essential predicate or law.
Austin does not ask himself what consequences derive from the fact that something possible—a
possible risk—is always possible, is somehow a necessary possibility. And if, such a necessary
possibility of failure being granted, it still constitutes an accident. What is a success when the
possibility of failure continues to constitute its structure?” (1982, p. 324; emphasis preserved and
added) My alternative interpretation of Austin—the New Austin—should make clear that these
observations should be considered as critical elaborations of Austinian ideas, not as critical
challenges to them. See my (2006) for a full articulation and defense of this point.
8. Through a variety of breaching experiments, Garfinkel and his followers studied how the
normative assumptions and expectations that structure people’s actions and reactions in particular
practices can be revealed and made explicit when they are violated. See Garfinkel (1967) and
Garfinkel and Sacks (1970). See also Boden and Zimmerman (1991).
9. I draw especially on the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1984) and (1991), but my view also connects
here with that of Judith Butler and others.
10. See Muñoz (1999) and Somerville (2000). See also Butler (1997) as well as my (2003) and
(2004).
11. I am here echoing Anzaldúa’s (1987/1999) terminology. For an analysis and discussion of her
view, see chapter 6 of my (2005).
12. A clear example of infelicitous subjectivity that is produced as a result of processes of
oppression and marginalization can be found in transgendered subjects. These subjects have been
used as negative exemplars of the violation of gender norms; and, when they have not been silenced
completely, their expression of gender meanings have been considered intrinsically unintelligible.
See Scheman (1997) and Butler (2004). See also my discussion on pages 84-85 of my (2006).
13. “Deslenguadas. Somos las del español deficiente.” We are your linguistic nightmare, your
linguistic aberration, your linguistic mestisaje, the subject of your burla. Because we speak with
tongues of fire we are culturally crucified. Racially, culturally, and linguistically somos huérfanos—
we speak an orphan tongue.” (Anzaldúa 1999, p. 80).
14. This silencing is certainly gender-specific. As Anzaldúa notes, in the case of Chicanas, the
silencing of their ethnic voices converges with the silencing of their female voices. In this sense she
describes how she was raised, as a woman, in a “tradition of silence”: “Ser habladora was to be a
gossip and a liar, to talk too much. […]Hocicona, repelona, chismosa […] are all signs of being
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mal criada. In my culture they are all words that are derogatory if applied to women—I’ve never
heard them applied to men.” (p. 76) This double oppression and marginalization as woman and
Chicana that Anzaldúa describes reminds us that there are multiple and converging fronts of
oppression. The phenomenon of multiple oppression has been discussed and theorized by Lugones
(2003). It is also the topic of my (2003).
15. Anzaldúa makes this point in very Wittgensteinian terms, calling for the construction of a
“We”— un “Nosotras”—around a common tongue that corresponds to a shared form of life. She
writes: “Chicano Spanish is a border tongue which developed naturally. […] Chicano Spanish is
not incorrect, it is a living language. […] for a people who cannot entirely identify with either
standard (formal, Castillian) Spanish nor standard English, what recourse is left to them but to
create their own language? A language which they can connect their identity to, one capable of
communicating the realities and values true to themselves.” (p. 77).
16. As Anzaldúa points out, “there is no one Chicano language just as there is no one Chicano
experience.” (p. 80) Even for a single individual, taking pride in one’s tongue is typically not a
single, unified task, but a plurality of tasks, with multiple fronts, for we speak in many tongues:
“because we are a complex, heterogeneous people, we speak many languages.” (p. 77).
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